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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
with reference to the fact situation in the International Shoe Co. case,
said anything that would justify the basing of jurisdiction on a single
act, be it contractual or tortious in nature.'3
A practical criterion also will establish that the court in the in-
stant case overextended the rule to protect its residents. By predi-
cating jurisdiction on a single tortious act, an interesting anomaly
develops. Initially the court assumes jurisdiction over the defendant
because he has been charged with a tort. Upon litigation of the facts
it may appear that no tort had been committed. Thus, the court
after having caused the parties to litigate the facts before it, must
admit that it had no jurisdiction in the first place. The result is
tantamount to basing jurisdiction on the allegations contained in the
plaintiff's complaint.
It is submitted that the instant case in basing jurisdiction on
the commission of a single tort has made too deep an inroad on the
traditional concept of jurisdiction. It erred in applying the rule of
the International Shoe Co. case to a situation never contemplated by
the Court in that decision.
X
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS - CONVERSION - FORGED INDORSE-
MENT.-On February 1, 1946, a firm of stockbrokers drew its check
on defendant bank as drawee payable to plaintiff. One Savitt, to
whom the check was entrusted for delivery, presented the check at
defendant bank and received payment for it upon the forged indorse-
ment of plaintiff. The check was never certified by the defendant.
Plaintiff, alleging she received no notice of the forgery until 1949,
made demand and brought an action against the bank. Special Term
granted defendant's motion to dismiss. Held, affirmed. As to the
first cause of action,' it is clear that plaintiff would have been entitled
'3 Other statutes which subject to jurisdiction a person doing a single act
are distinguishable from the statute in the instant case. For instance, a statute
which subjected to jurisdiction a non-resident motorist whose use of the state's
highways resulted in the commission of a tort was upheld in Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U. S. 352 (1927). But, in that case the statute, directed against a specific
inherently dangerous type of conduct, ultimately based "jurisdiction" on the
consent of the non-resident which was implied from his voluntary use of the
highways. In the instant case the statute, directed against generally undefined
conduct, purports to base jurisdiction on "presence" by making a tort tanta-
mount to doing business within the state.
1 In the same complaint, plaintiff alleged a second cause of action based
on a check drawn on the Security Trust Company, and also cashed by Savitt
at the defendant bank. The court affirmed the action of Special Term in de-
nying defendant's motion to dismiss.
In relation to the second check, the defendant was a collecting bank. The
liability of a collecting bank which pays a check on a forged indorsement is
beyond the scope of this article.
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to recover in an action for conversion commenced before the three-
year period of limitations had run. Henderson v. Lincoln Rochester
Trust Co., 303 N. Y. 27, 100 N. E. 2d 117 (1951).
It is well settled that the drawer may maintain an action in con-
tract against a drawee bank which pays on a forged indorsement,2
since by making payment, the bank breaches its implied obligation
to disburse money only upon the depositor's order.3 The rule is
otherwise with respect to the payee. While the bank is under a
contractual duty to the drawer to pay checks only in exact conformity
with the drawer's directions,4 no such privity of contract exists be-
tween the payee and the drawee bank until acceptance or certifica-
tion by the bank.6 It is therefore apparent that the payee could not
possibly have maintained an action in contract against the drawee
bank.6
In the principal case, any possible conversion action was barred
by the statute of limitations. The provocative question is raised,
however, whether a payee may maintain a conversion action against
a drawee bank which pays a check on a forged or unauthorized
indorsement.
Conversion is defined as an "[u] nauthorized assumption and ex-
ercise of the right of ownership over goods belonging to another to
the exclusion of the owner's rights." 7 Neither Section 127 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law (providing for the freedom from lia-
bility of the drawee of a draft before acceptance), nor Section 189
2 Segal v. Nat. City Bank of New York, 183 Misc. 994, 1001, 52 N. Y. S.
2d 727, 734 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (motion for summary judgment granted), reed
on other grounds inein., 269 App. Div. 986, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 261 (2d Dep't 1945).
3 Shipman v. Bank ,of the State of New York, 126 N. Y. 318, 327, 27
N. E. 371, 372 (1891) ; cf. Crawford v. West Side Bank, 100 N. Y. 50, 2 N. E.
881 (1885). "In discharging its obligation as a debtor, the bank must do so
subject to the rules obtaining between principal and agent.
"In disbursing the customer's funds, it can pay them only in conformity
to his directions. . . ." Id. at 53, 2 N. E. at 881.
4 Sweeney v. Nat. City Bank of Troy, 263 App. Div. 418, 33 N. Y. S. 2d
885 (3d Dep't 1942), aff'd, 290 N. Y. 624, 48 N. E. 2d 711 (1943); accord,
Critten v. Chemical Nat. Bank, 171 N. Y. 219, 224, 63 N. E. 969, 970 (1902).
5 See note 8 infra.
6 First Nat. Bank of Washington v. Whitman, 94 U. S. 343 (1876);
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Moultrie Banking Co., 45 Ga. App. 768, 165 S. E.
860 (1932); NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 189; N. Y. NEG. INsT. LAW§ 325.
7 Laverty v. Snethen, 68 N. Y. 522 524 (1877); accord, Eureka County
Bank v. Clarke, 130 Fed. 325 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 195 U. S. 631 (1904).
The definition poses many problems when it is applied to the case of a payee
suing for the conversion of an uncertified check which never came into his
possession. Does the uncertified check "belong" to the payee? Is the payee's
tentative expectation of possession a sufficient property or possessory right to
be protected by the conversion action? Again, is it desirable to project the
necessity of the common law elements of the tort into the field of bills and
notes, where liability is largely imposed by legislative fiat, and where the stat-
utes represent a codification of the law merchant rather than of the common
law?
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(providing for the freedom from liability of the drawee of an un-
certified check) affirmatively provides for such an action.8
Still, the action has often been successfully maintained on the
theory that the payee is the rightful owner.9 Other cases have de-
nied the action, ° on the ground that no property right of the payee
is appropriated by the drawee bank since the payee still has his ac-
tion against the drawer."- On the other hand, it has been stated
that to allow the payee to proceed directly against the drawee bank
tends to avoid circuity of action.12  Some courts have considered
the return of the check to the drawer as the assumption of ddminion
necessary to constitute conversion,' 8 and usually it is the check it-
self and not the funds to pay it, which is the subject of the tort.' 4
In some of the cases permitting the actions the possession of
the payee's absconding agent who forges the indorsement has been
8 Compare NEGOT ABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 127; N. Y. NEG. INST. LAW
§ 211. "A bill of itself does not operate as an assignment of the funds in the
hands of the drawee . .. and the drawee is not liable on the bill unless and
until he accepts . . . ," with NaoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 189; N. Y.
NEG. INsT. LAW § 325. "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment
of any part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank, and the
bank is not liable to the holdeir, unless and until it accepts or certifies the
check."
Considering an action on the bill as one in contract upon the instrument
itself, Section 127 by implication leaves room for an action of conversion
where the payee is suing the drawee to recover for a loss caused by a forged
indorsement on an ordinary draft. It is difficult to draw the same inference
with relation to an action for conversion of a check in view of the wording
of Section 189. The problem is analyzed in detail in an exhaustive note,
38 HARV. L. REv. 857, 869 (1925).
OLouisville & N. R. R. v. Citizens' & Peoples' Nat. Bank of Pensacola,
74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104 (1917) ; State v. First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque, 38
N. M. 225, 30 P. 2d 728 (1934); cf. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v.
Bear Butte Valley Bank, 63 S. D. 262, 257 N. W. 642, 643 (1934).
10 Sinclair Refining Co. v. Moultrie Banking Co., 45 Ga. App. 768, 165
S. E. 860 (1932) ; Gordon Fireworks Co. v. Capital Nat. Bank, 236 Mich. 271,
210 N. W. 263 (1926); Miller v. Northern Bank, 239 Wis. 12, 300 N. W.
758 (1941).
1" In Miller v. Northern Bank, supra note 10 at 760, the court said: "The
drawer's account remained intact in the bank and the respondent's cause of
action against her brokers who were the drawers of the check was in no way
interfered with." See Nat. Union Bank of Maryland v. Miller Rubber Co.
of New York, 148 Md. 449, 129 Atl. 688, 690 (1925).
1226 COL. L. REv. 113, 114 (1926) ; 12 Tsx. L. REv. 226, 227 (1934).
1" Blacker & Shepard Co. v. Granite Trust Co., 284 Mass. 9, 187 N. E. 53
(1933).
14 Blacker & Shepard Co. v. Granite Trust Co., .mpra note 13; State v.
First Nat. Bank of Albuquerque, 38 N. M. 225, 30 P. 2d 728, 732 (1934);
cf. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Bear Butte Valley Bank, 63 S. D.
262, 257 N. W. 642, 643 (1934). But see Goodall Real Estate & Ins. Co. v.
North Birmingham American Bank, 225 Ala. 507, 144 So. 7, 9 (1932) (plain-
tiff waived the tort and recovered in an action for money had and received);
Kentucky Title Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Dunavan, 205 Ky. 801, 266 S. W.
667, 670 (1924) (drawee held liable on both grounds; assertion of dominion
over the check, and appropriation of the funds).
[ VOL. 26
RECENT DECISIONS
held to be the possession of the principal.1 5 In thus considering the
plaintiff-payee's constructive possession, these courts have at least
given lip service to thecommon law elements of the tort. The fact
of the plaintiff's prior possession has not always been considered im-
portant, however, and, where the drawee bank has been negligent, a
recovery has been allowed without treatment of the question.'
Aside from the above considerations, there is little symmetry
in the pattern of decisional law, either in the ratio decidendii, or in
the circumstances giving rise to the suit. Professor Britton17 takes
the novel position that a payment to an agent of the payee who signs
the payee's name may well not be a payment under a forged indorse-
ment at all. The reason assigned is that presentment of an uncer-
tified check to the drawee is merely a surrender for payment, the
payee's signature operating only as a receipt and not as an indorse-
ment. He concedes that liability in conversion will still result where
the agent had no authority to collect, since the drawee has exercised
dominion over the instrument by paying it to someone other than the
holder. 18
Strangely, there has been but one New York case directly in
point since the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law. In
Spaulding v. First National Bank 19 the complaint alleged that
• . . plaintiff was . . . the owner of, and entitled to possession of,
a certain check . . . that defendant wrongfully disposed of and con-
verted said check and the proceeds thereof to its own use ....
There was no allegation of negligence or of the plaintiff's prior pos-
session of the check. The court denied the defendant's motion to
dismiss but recognized that the authorities did not universally permit
the action to be maintained.20 The court categorically affirmed the
right of the payee to recover, without considering either the plain-
tiff's prior possession or the defendant's negligence as a prerequisite
to the action.
Despite the many reasons and underlying circumstances it is
evident that a majority rule has nevertheless developed allowing a
recovery in conversion in a variety of factual situations. The rule
has received some criticism, principally on the ground that it deviates
from the expressed intent of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The
dissenting justice in State v. First National Bank of Albuquerque 2 1
vigorously protested: "To permit recovery in trover and deny it
15 Louisville & N. R. R. v. Citizens' & Peoples' Nat. Bank of Pensacola,
74 Fla. 385, 77 So. 104, 105 (1917); accord, State v. First Nat. Bank of
Albuquerque, 38 N. M. 225, 30 P. 2d 728, 732 (1934).
16 Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Bank of Charleston Nat. Banking
Ass'n, 267 Fed. 367 (4th Cir. 1920).
17 BarroN, BILLS AND No Es § 146 (1943).
Ls Ibid.
19210 App. Div. 216, 205 N. Y. Supp. 492 (4th Dep't), aff'd mere., 239
N. Y. 586, 147 N. E. 206 (1924).
20 Id. at 217, 205 N. Y. Supp. at 493.
2138 N. M. 225, 30 P. 2d 728, 733 (1934).
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in assumpsit is to circumvent the intended purpose of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, and extend the common law fiction of pleading in
trover to an extent that even the pleaders during the time of Bracton
dared not indulge. .. ." Likewise, the growth of the rule has been
attributed to a failure on the part of the courts to give due consid-
eration to the effect of abolishing the theory of the assignment of the
account by the drawer upon the issuance of the check.
22
In the new Uniform Commercial Code, it is specifically provided
that payment on a forged instrument is a conversion. 28  The Code,
in amending and combining Sections 127 and 189 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, 24 also attempts to remove some of the existing
doubts as to potential tort liability arising outside the instrument.2 5
X
TORTs-NUISANCE-LIABILITY FOR DOUBLE-PARKIN.-Plain-
tiff lawfully parked his car on a public street. When he returned
forty minutes later, he was unable to leave because defendant
had double-parked alongside his car. Plaintiff claimed that as
a result of such discomfort and inconvenience he suffered damages
in the amount of twenty-five dollars. Defendant moved for judgment
on the pleadings. Held, motion denied. The complaint states a cause
of action. An obstruction in the public highway is a nuisance.
Harnik v. Levine, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (N. Y. Munic. Ct. 1951).
The steadily increasing volume of traffic in the City of New
York has produced a situation in which the lot of the average motor-
ist is far from a happy one. Among the more frustrating concomit-
ants of such a situation is the virtual imprisonment of one lawfully
parked by a double-parker. Practical experience clearly demonstrates
that the annoyance and inconvenience caused thereby is not a ficti-
tious element. Few such victims, however, have attempted to litigate
their rights.
Concededly, double-parking is a violation of the Traffic Regula-
tions of the City of New York which provide: "No person shall
park a vehicle: ... (o) on the roadway side of any vehicle stopped
or parked at the edge or curb of a street. (Double-parking.)" 1
22 Miller v. Northern Bank, 239 Wis. 12, 300 N. W. 758, 760 (1941).
23 UNIFORM COmmERCIAL CODE § 3-419 (Spring 1951).
24 UNIFORM CO MMERCUL CODE §3-409 (Spring 1951). "(1) A check or
other draft does not of itself operate as an assignment of any funds in the
hands of the drawee available for its payment, and the drawee is not liable
on the instrument until he accepts it." See note 6 supra.25 UNIFORM COmmERCIAL CODE § 3-409, Comment 3 (Spring 1950). "The
language of the original section 189, that the drawee is not liable 'to the holder,'
is changed as inaccurate and not intended. The drawee is not liable on the in-
strument until he accepts; but he remains subject to any other liability to the
holder."
1TrFAmc REGULATIONS OF TIE CITy OF NEW YORK Art. 2, § 10(o).
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